for in the world. And not only Americans. Just now it is hard to imagine, but it should not be forgotten that for much of history since the American Revolution, the example of the United States and its ideals have served as inspiration to countless movements-in Latin America, Europe, Southeast Asia and elsewhere-which sought to throw off foreign rule.
Perhaps the single most striking example of this pattern was the "Wilsonian moment" of 1919: after a world war that caused unprecedented devastation, Wilson was hailed in Europe, and many places besides, as a herald of peace, independence, and dignity. For a brief period, in the words of H. G. Wells, he "ceased to be a common statesman; he became a Messiah." 1 The American president soon proved to be a false Messiah, and in the decades since Wilson, his ideas, and his policies have had many critics. In the wake of Versailles, the president's Republican opponents attacked him for compromising American sovereignty in his quest for the League of Nations, while erstwhile supporters were disappointed that he had not gone far enough: rather than heralding the promised "new order" where right would triumph over might, the peace treaty reaffirmed the old order of empire and domination. In the middle decades of the last century, as the collapse of the Versailles settlement led to another world war and then a Cold War, Wilson came under fire from realist critics like E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and George F. Kennan. They ridiculed his naïve, impractical "idealism" and "moralism", and called for a clear-eyed 3 approach to international relations that proceeded, to cite latter-day realist Condoleeza Rice, "from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community." 2 Some of these early critics have since changed their views. Kennan, shaken by the superpower conflict that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war, admitted in 1989 that he had reversed his earlier view of Wilson and now saw him as a leader "of broad vision and acute sensitivities" who was "ahead of any other statesman of his time." A number of core terms-slogans, really-have come to be commonly identified as Wilsonian: collective security, self-determination, making the world safe for democracy. In and of themselves, they are not sufficient to form a coherent, or even comprehensible, approach to the role of the United States in the world, though they do tend to suggest what Wilsonianism is not. It is not isolationism, since it implies a robust American engagement with the world, and it is not "realism," since it both draws on American "ideals" in articulating its vision for world order and calls, as a matter of policy, for spreading those ideals as broadly as possible to diverse societies across the globe. Such negative definitions and references to broad inspirations and aspirations, however, still leave "Wilsonianism" as a nebulous concept, one that may serve as rhetorical background noise to a whole range of different attitudes and policies but cannot point toward any one coherent approach to the United States' role in the world. In order to restore clarity and focus to core aspects of Wilson's vision for world order and for America's role within it, it may therefore be worthwhile to go back and reexamine his original blueprint for postwar international organization.
Two notions were most identified with Wilson's program in his own time: the League of Nations and the principle of self-determination. Neither term, nor the ideas behind them, originated with Wilson. Nevertheless, he was the first major statesman to pluck these notions out of the realm of intellectual speculation and political marginality, synthesize them into a plan for restructuring postwar international relations, and make what seemed to be a credible commitment to implement them. By the time of the armistice in November 1918 they had become inextricably linked with him in the minds of millions worldwide, even though the projects implied in both terms remained controversial on grounds of desirability as well as feasibility. The League on Nations idea, while it attracted wide support as a general principle, remained highly contentious as to its specific mode of implementation, and indeed this was the issue that eventually led to the rejection of the entire Treaty of Versailles in the United States Senate. And the notion of self-determination, while widely embraced by claimants to independent nationstatehood both within and outside Europe, was, not surprisingly, fiercely resisted in its broader implications by the imperial great powers as well as by many of Wilson's own advisers. Wilson's own secretary of state, Robert Lansing, warned darkly at the time "of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races," since they were bound to lead to "impossible demands" and "breed discontent, disorder and rebellion". 4 In retrospect, most students of international relations would probably cite the notion of "collective security"-the mutual guarantee provided by members of the League of Nations for each others' sovereignty and territorial integrity-as the main legacy of the Wilsonian plan for international organization. This principle was enshrined 6 in the ill-fated Article X of the League covenant. "The Members of the League," it read, "undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. League with an open-ended authority to redraw the boundaries of existing states based on such a broad array of loosely defined guidelines suggests that, in his conception of the League, he envisioned an organization that would do far more than simply provide a collective security guarantee for existing states. Indeed, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that what he had in mind was to fashion the League as an incipient organ of global governance, placing it at the center of an international system in which the 9 sovereignty of individual states would be thoroughly penetrated by and dependant on the organized force of "world opinion," to use one of Wilson's own favorite concepts.
Such revolutionary ideas were bound to meet with opposition from the leaders of the other great powers at the negotiation Hunter Miller, the international lawyer who was the chief American legal expert responsible for negotiating the final text of the League covenant, warned the president that his provisions for continuous adjustment of boundaries in accordance with the principle of self-determination would make "dissatisfaction permanent," compelling "every power to engage in propaganda" and legalizing "irredentist agitation." 8 When
Miller met his British counterpart in order to merge the various American and British proposals for the League covenant into a single document, the two quickly agreed that this section of Wilson's draft simply had to go.
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In the end, the near universal opposition that his draft of Article III met Paris forced the president to acquiesce to the evisceration of his version of what would become Article X. After insisting on the retention of the offending paragraphs in several consecutive drafts, he finally allowed the legal experts-despite his famous quip that he would never allow the league to be designed by lawyers-to delete everything but the first section of the article, which guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence for existing states. Thus, the article was transformed: from a radical move to subordinate the sovereignty of individual states to an international body, it now became a commitment to defend it against all challenges. What Wilson had conceived as an instrument of managing change in the international system now became a tool order, designed to preserve the status quo. For Wilson, of course, these two aspects of the international system, order and change, were not only compatible but interdependent.
International peace and prosperity, in the long term, required a flexible system that would respond to changing conditions, but would manage change through a rational and orderly process that reflected principles of justice and legitimacy as well as relations of power.
The final version of Article X failed to achieve that balance, and was therefore roundly suspects, he saw it as a backdoor for introducing the same principles outlined, far more directly and forcefully, in his original version of Article X. Namely, that the League was entitled, indeed obligated, to intervene in the internal affairs of states-hence his frequent 12 emphasis on the phrase "any circumstance whatever"-if they were deemed a threat to international peace.
The Wilsonian program for the postwar order has often been described by historians as designed to stem the spread of the revolutionary fervor then emanating out of Russia, and indeed, in some ways it was. In its own manner, however, it too was revolutionary. Wilson did not want the League to be designed by lawyers because he suspected that they were too conservative: bound by precedence and prudence, they would fail to grasp the broader picture, as he saw it, of a radically changed world. As his draft version for Article X makes clear, Wilson rejected as inadequate the system of "collective security" among existing states that his advisers and allies wanted because he saw such a system as reflecting a much-too-narrow view of the threats to peace. The dangers, he thought, inhered not only in the aggressive designs of existing states but also-perhaps primarily-in their domestic structures, where oppression along ethnic, social, or political lines would lead instability and violence that would, in turn, imperil world peace. In order to ward off such dangers, Wilson was willing to give his world assembly extraordinary powers to intervene in the internal affairs of existing states and even manipulate their essential structures, if their internal conditions required it. In such a
Wilsonian order, the security of existing states and regimes, far from guaranteed by a system of "collective security," could in fact be severely compromised if the interests of "world peace," as determined by the League, required it.
Wilson's vision for a new international order, then, was far more radical than most observers, including most of his critics, either realized at the time or remember now.
He wanted-he thought it imperative for international peace-to challenge the primacy of state sovereignty in international relations, and institute a world council which would have the authority to intervene in the internal affairs of states, redraw boundaries, and Wilson himself, however, had come to believe that the mode of US actions to promote international peace was no less important than the goal itself. Having learned the lessons of the failed interventions of his early period in office, most conspicuously in peace", then the United States, as the leading nation in world affairs, could be expected to do no less.
The recovery of the radical nature of Wilson's blueprint for international order does not resolve the arguments between its proponents and opponents about the feasibility and even the desirability of his vision. It is still possible today to argue, as E.
H. Carr did nearly seventy years ago, that while aspirations for global harmony may be admirable, the "embryonic character" of "common feeling between nations"-that is, the relative lack of shared values and a sense of common identity-does no bode well for any attempt to institute "an international procedure of peaceful change." 11 The story of
Wilson's original draft of Article X, however, does help to restore some coherence to our understanding of his vision of world order, and clarify the boundaries of what could properly qualify as "Wilsonian": perhaps better described as "liberal globalism" rather than internationalism, since the president clearly sought to construct a world body that would not merely facilitate relations between sovereign states but transcend them; one that would give effective institutional form to the common values that, he believed, were bound to be shared by all peoples.
The ideas that Wilson articulated inspired millions in Europe and elsewhere in the immediate wake of the war, but they were far too radical for most of those who held 
